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Abstract
This paper addresses the issue of defining con-
text, and more specifically the different con-
texts needed for understanding a particular
type of texts. The corpus chosen is homoge-
neous and allows us to determine characteristic
properties of the texts from which certain in-
ferences can be drawn by the reader. These
characteristic properties come from the real
world domain (K-context), the type of events
the texts describe (F-context) and the genre of
the texts (E-context). Together, these three
contexts provide elements for the resolution of
anaphoric expressions and for several types of
disambiguation. We show in particular that the
argumentation aspect of these texts is an essen-
tial part of the context and explains some of the
inferences that can be drawn.
1 Introduction
We must first emphasize that our objectives in this pa-
per are not general considerations about context or the
theory of context, but that they are guided by the partic-
ular goals of a specific project. The work reported here
is the result of a study done within a larger project on
the “Semantics of Natural Languages”, viewed from the
fields of Artificial Intelligence and Computational Lin-
guistics, in which we are treating a corpus of real texts.
The corpus consists of a number of insurance claim re-
ports for car accidents.1 This corpus offers a number of
advantages, the main one being its unity, with respect
to a) the domain involved (which is relatively circum-
scribed) and b) the conditions of enunciation (which are
almost always the same). Indeed, the texts are written
1 The project Se´mantiques des Langues Naturelles, spon-
sored by the French Ministe`re de la Recherche and the CNRS,
involves a number of research centers and university laborato-
ries [Gsem, 1990a], [Estival & Gayral, 1994]. The texts were
provided by the French insurance company MAIF, after being
made anonymous. They have been translated into English by
D.E.
after an accident and their quasi-institutional nature im-
poses a number of constraints on their production and,
in a symmetric way, on their interpretation. This allows
us to focus on the characteristic properties of the type
of the texts, and to draw inferences from them.
We can then better define the notion of context and
answer the following questions, which are those we ad-
dress more specifically in this paper:
• In which way does context affect interpretation of
NL utterances and texts?
• Which aspects of context or which contexts result
in refined, more general, and different interpretations of
NL?
• What is context?
• How many contexts are there?
2 The Contexts of the Corpus
All the texts are written in similar circumstances and be-
long to a culturally well-defined genre which both writer
and reader are perfectly aware of when writing or reading
one of them. An insurance claim report for a car acci-
dent is not a newspaper story, nor a letter to a friend
narrating the accident, but an almost institutionalized
document which obeys certains constraints concerning
its content as well as its form. As emphasized by Rastier
in [Rastier et al., 1994], genre constraints play a major
role in the interpretation process. In order to describe
these constraints, we distinguish three types of contexts,
which we refer to as:
• K-context (knowledge context): This is what is
usually meant by “context” and it refers to the
extra-linguistic knowledge for the particular domain
of the texts. In this case, our K-context is that of
the world of road traffic, and it concerns vehicles,
vehicle motions, traffic rules, the usual behavior of
drivers and pedestrians, as well as their expecta-
tions, and also some elements of “naive” geometry.
• F-context (factual context): For this type of texts,
there are two factual constraints bearing on the
content of the text:
– the text is a narration in which an accident takes
place;
– the text involves at least two participants, gener-
ally two vehicles, one of which is the author’s.
• E-context (context of the enunciation): The con-
ditions of enunciation (the discourse constraints)
for those texts are:
– an imposed format: Before writing their text, the
authors must check some boxes on the insurance
claim form. These boxes are labelled with ready-
made expressions and phrases which influence the
vocabulary that is then used in the running text
(terms such as vehicle, or the use of the labels “A”
and “B” for each of the protagonists). On the in-
surance claim form, the space in which the author
can write this text is pre-defined. It is rather small
and thus the text must be rather short, at most one
paragraph.
– known addressee: The recipient of the text is
known, it is the insurance company. Thus the ar-
gumentative aspect of the text is also known in ad-
vance: the authors of the texts will try to lessen
their responsibility.
We will show how these three context types are used
by the authors to write their texts and symmetrically by
the readers to interpret them. These two symmetrical
tasks are both composed of a factual and an argumen-
tative part, which coincide with the two goals we can
define for an NLP approach to both understanding and
processing these texts. One of these goals is the factual
analysis which is necessary to recreate the event: “What
happened? What real world events concerning the mo-
tions of these vehicles or the scene geometry actually oc-
curred?”.2 The other is an argumentative analysis which
takes into account the nature and intent of the text in
order to uncover the argumentative devices used by the
writer.
Although we can thus clearly delineate these two goals,
they may not be so neatly separated in practice and we
find that, in real text processing, they are intertwined in
such a way that solving one level of analysis requires ele-
ments from the other. Similarly, although the division of
context into three context types is extremely useful and
revealing, we sometimes have to invoke more than one of
them to treat some aspects of our texts. Nevertheless, we
organize the remainder of this paper along the way these
three context types can be used to describe the processes
necessary for both the production and interpretation of
our texts.
2 We [Estival & Gayral, 1994] take an approach close to
that of [Barwise, 1988], where the notation “P = CLC(T, c)”
denotes the informative content P of the text T used in cir-
cumstances c, with the language conventions LC shared by
all the participants.
3 The three types of Contexts
Whereas E-context and F-context are particular to this
type of texts, K-context is independent of the type of
texts: the knowledge involved will be the same whether
the text is an accident report or a newspaper article and
any text dealing with the road domain will invoke the
same K-context.
3.1 K-context
K-context can be taken as the domain ontology for these
texts. It is already well-established that domain ontology
is necessary for natural language understanding and that
purely linguistic knowledge is not sufficient. In our texts,
K-context includes knowledge about the Rules of the
Road, about driving, and the typical knowledge about
the objects evoked and their relations with each other,
hierarchical or otherwise. This knowledge is shared by
the writer (W ) and the reader (R) and it is used by the
reader in a number of specific tasks, in particular to solve
anaphors and to make inferences.
3.1.1 Rules of the Road
In these texts, the vehicles are supposed to be moving
in a space which is regulated by the French traffic rules
(Code de la route) and the drivers are supposed to obey
those rules. For instance, we can see how knowledge
about stop-signs is used when we examine the reasoning
which must be made by the reader of (1) to reconstruct
the scene (two vehicles, with their right blinker on, are
stopped in front of the writer’s at a stop-sign).
(1) I was at a stop-sign with two cars in front of
me turning to the right towards Mours. While
the first car was going through this stop-sign
I performed my check to the left and started
but I hit the second car which hadn’t yet gone
through the stop-sign (A1)
First, the knowledge that “Drivers must stop at a stop-
sign.” is useful to infer that the interpretation for I was
at a stop-sign here is clearly I was stopped at a stop-sign,
although the verb to be in the past tense (an imperfect
in the original text) followed by a locative adverbial does
not necessarily entail that its subject is stopped; indeed,
one can say I was on the highway without implying that
one was not moving.
Second, the reader uses the rule “If X is at a stop-
sign and X has switched his right blinker on, X will turn
right” to interpret with two cars in front of me turn-
ing to the right as “The two cars were stopped and had
switched their right blinker on” rather than “The two
cars were turning right”, an interpretation which the
present participle would allow. This interpretation re-
quires some reasoning which is very difficult to automa-
tize in a computer program. Indeed, since W says that
the two vehicles were turning right while in fact they
were stopped, the expression turning right proves to be
only an intention: the cars were stopped but they were
“going to turn right”. If this intention had remained in
the mind of the driver, it would have been opaque to W ,
therefore an element expressing it must have been visible
and perceived by W : the right blinker.
Third, the sentence I performed my check to the
left is correctly understood by R because W and
R both know what actions are expected at a stop-
sign through the stereotyped knowledge or script
[Schank & Abelson, 1977] for “X being at a stop-sign”:
it implies both that X will not stay at this stop-sign and
that, in order to go through it, X must check the road
for safety, i.e. check that no vehicle is coming.
Drivers also know what they must do in case of an
accident: they should fill in a car accident report, sign
it, get it signed by the other driver(s) (and witnesses if
any) involved, and send it to their insurance company.
In (2), several linguistic elements can only be understood
through the knowledge of what is expected in that situ-
ation.
(2) Heavy traffic on Bd Sebastopol. I was driving
between two lanes of stopped cars when one
of the cars on my left opened its right front
door. To avoid it, I swerved, which made me
touch vehicle B with the rear of my motorcy-
cle, which made me fall. Because of the heavy
traffic that day, we only exchanged our in-
surance companies and names which explains
why the report is only signed by me. (A3)
The second relative pronoun which refers not to the
fact of having exchanged insurance information and
names, but to the fact that this is all that happened,
while much more would have been expected from the
accident script: i.e. get the report form, check the ap-
propriate boxes, make the drawing, write the report, and
sign it. The word only (juste in the French text) signals
that something is missing, that there is a deviation with
respect to the situation expected from the K-context.
The relative pronoun thus refers to what is actually miss-
ing from the reported scene, but which would have been
implied otherwise.
3.1.2 Typicality
Typicality can first be considered at the lexical level.
Indeed, any domain ontology induces certain preferences
for the interpretation of lexical items which may have
several meanings, and there are examples in our texts
where lexical typicality helps resolve polysemy (which
may not even be noticed by a human reader, but would
cause problems in machine processing).
For example, in the phrase je roulais which occurs
very often in our texts, e.g. in (3), the verb rouler must
be interpreted as “to travel by means of a vehicle with
wheels” rather than as “to roll” (as in Paul roule dans
le sable/ Paul rolls in the sand) because the K-context
makes it improbable that a text describing a car accident
would talk about somebody rolling in the second sense.
(3) Je roulais sur la partie droite de la chausse´e
quand un ve´hicule arrivant en face dans le
virage a e´te´ comple`tement de´porte´. Serrant
a` droite au maximum, je n’ai pu e´viter la
voiture qui arrivait a` grande vitesse.
I was driving on the right hand side of the
road when a vehicle arriving in front of me in
the curve was completely thrown off course.
Keeping as close as possible to the right, I
wasn’t able to avoid the car which was coming
with great speed. (A8)
The notion of typicality (relative to a domain or a
context) also concerns the knowledge of which entities
are considered typical in that context. This is crucial
for determining what the entities mentioned in a text
are, and can also be illustrated with (3), where R must
determine that the two different expressions a vehicle
arriving in front of me in the curve and the car which
was coming with great speed are co-referent and thus that
the text only involves two vehicles.
First, the two terms being used, vehicle and car , are
compatible, indeed a car is a particular type of vehicle.
This fact can be extracted from a hierarchy of concepts
which is part of K-context. Second, in Western indus-
trialized countries the most typical vehicle is a car, so
without any other indication a vehicle is inferred to be,
typically or by default, a car.3 In (3), since W first uses
the word vehicle to introduce an object, R infers that
this vehicle is a car; this default conclusion is confirmed
by the next expression the car which was coming with
great speed .
The way R uses this Typicality Rule can be illus-
trated with the end of (2). As usual, the expression I
was driving implicitly introduces a vehicle, which is by
default a typical one, i.e. a car. R thus starts building
a representation for the scene with a car as W ’s vehi-
cle until the expression with the rear of my motorcycle
forces him to reconsider his previous interpretation of I
was driving as I was driving a car . Moreover, R must
then also reconsider the meaning of between two lanes
of stopped cars , in particular the actual width of space
associated with that expression. The first interpretation
induces a representation where there are three car lanes
and vehicle A is in the middle one (which is moving),
while the second interpretation leads to the correct spa-
tial representation, where there are only two car lanes
and vehicle A is between them.
3 Of course, typicality is a strongly cultural notion. In
China, for instance, the most typical vehicle could be a bicy-
cle and the word vehicle might by default refer to a bicycle.
We assume here that the determination of typicality in a lan-
guage is mediated through the actual hierarchy of concepts
which is culturally defined.
From W ’s point of view, the Typicality Rule can be
linked to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity: “Be as informative
as possible”. If the vehicle in the scene is not a typical
one, W should say so, or else he would be hiding an
important piece of information, useful for R to interpret
the text. The mild strangeness of (2) can be explained
by this minor violation.
Associations between entities may also be more or less
typical relative to a particular context, and these typi-
cal associations helps resolve associative anaphors and
metonymies. For instance, in (4 a.), knowing that there
are gas pumps in a gas station allows R to link the pump
to the gas station which is mentioned in the previous
sentence. Similarly, we know that when a car door is
smashed, someone must be responsible, which explains
the definite article in (4 b.).
(4) a. I was entering (vehicle A) the lane into a
gas station. The pump being out of order,
I was backing up to leave when I hit vehicle
B which had also entered the same lane to
get gas. (A17)
b. Having left my car to call a mechanic, I
came back to find it with the right back
door bashed in with no note left by the
guilty party. (A2)
Metonymy is a general linguistic device, i.e. part of
LC, which is often used to allow the identification (in-
ter alia) of a container with its content, and a common
use of metonymy in our texts concerns the vehicle and its
driver. Metonymy creates a unique discourse entity with
properties coming from the elements being identified. A
common use of metonymy in our texts concerns the ve-
hicle and its driver. This metonymy allows transference
of properties either from the driver to the car, e.g. inten-
tionality in(5 a.) and agentivity in (5 b.), or from the car
to its driver, as in (6 a.) where objects (here the bumper)
belonging to the vehicle are treated as belonging to the
driver, or (6 b.) where the property of “rolling along”
(the literal meaning of the verb rouler) is transferred to
the driver.4
This use of metonymy follows the coercion of seman-
tic types (see [Pustejovsky, 1989b]) in a predictable way:
the properties being used to make an entity of one type
(e.g. car : “inanimate mechanical object”) into an en-
tity of another type (e.g. driver : “human agent”) are
extractible in a regular way from the predicate (e.g.
squeeze: “requires an agentive subject”). We show in
section 3.3 below the role played by metonymy in argu-
mentation.
(5) a. Vehicle B seemd to want to let vehicle A
go through, (B42)
4 We can note that the use of this metonymy is not
symmetrical: the other protagonist is aften only perceived
through his car (i.e. car− >driver), while the writer sees his
car as an extension of himself (i.e. driver− >car).
b. Being momentarily stopped in the right
lane on Boulevard des Italiens, I had
switched my blinker on; I was at a stop and
getting ready to change lanes. Vehicle B
coming from my left squeezed too close to
me and damaged the whole left front side.
(A7)
(6) a. my bumper (A11)
b. Je roulais (I was driving, literally I was
rolling)
3.1.3 Spatial and physical knowledge
As part of K-context, the knowledge of a number of
spatial or physical facts (cinematics, dynamics, etc.) is
required to understand what happens in a text about
road accidents. For example, in (2), R must be able to
conclude that vehicle B is to the right of vehicle A. The
reasoning is obvious: swerving to avoid a car door on
the left can only be done with any plausibility towards
the right. Nevertheless, for an automatic treatment of
such inferences, we must give all the rules needed for re-
constructing this natural reasoning. [Gayral, 1992] and
[Gayral et al., 1994] attempt to provide such a model,
based on naive physics.
In the case of text (3), R will deduce without any
difficulty that vehicle B was driving too fast when it
entered the curve and that this excessive speed was the
cause of it being thrown off course. But this excessive
speed is only mentioned in the second sentence of the
text, and there is no linguistic motivation for associating
it with the previous event arriving in front of me in the
curve described in the first sentence. However, this is
what K-context allows R to do. On the one hand, when
a vehicle is thrown off course, some typical reasons such
as a slippery road, high speed, or a mechanical incident
come to mind; these can include a curve linked with high
speed. On the other hand, when a vehicle is “thrown
off course in a curve” one usually does not speed up
but rather brakes. So, in (3), since the vehicle had an
excessive speed after being thrown off course, it would
necessarily have had this high speed before being thrown
off course.
3.2 F-context
3.2.1 Parameter “Accident”
In many of our texts, the accident is explicitly
mentioned with verbs such as percuter, endommager,
toucher, heurter (“collide”, “damage”, “touch”, “hit”),
or with nouns such as choc, collision (“impact”, “col-
lision”). Interestingly, the word accident itself almost
never occurs, and the accident is evoked with some more
or less complex paraphrase. This aspect of the texts is
linked to E-context and the argumentative component in
an accident report. The writers use circumlocutions to
emphasize the idea that the accident happened in spite
of all their efforts to avoid it. One of the best examples
is (7):
(7) We certainly got closer and consequently hit
each other, her car getting stuck into mine,
its left fender into the right front side of my
car. (A17)
But this is not the case in (8), a text for which, if it
was another type of narrative, we might imagine other
endings to the incident (e.g. but I was able to swerve and
avoid it).
(8) We were in Saint-Ouen, I was surprised by
the person who braked in front of me, not be-
ing able to change lanes, and the road being
wet, I couldn’t stop completely in time (A15)
We can see here the effect of the “Accident” param-
eter: since these texts are accident reports, the series
of events they relate must by default contain an acci-
dent. The interpretation of the texts often requires the
reconstruction of an impact between the two vehicles, as
in (8), where the incident which is described would not
otherwise warrant the existence of the report. We will
see more instance of this in section 3.3, where we look
at its argumentative effect.
The existence of the impact can then be deduced from
a combination of several clues, some linguistic, some in-
ferential. Among the former, we often find the combi-
nation of the negation with a verbal group of the form
“can/be able to + V”, for instance I couldn’t stop com-
pletely in time in (8), or I wasn’t able to avoid the car
which was coming with great speed in (3).
3.2.2 Parameter “Participants”
The fact that car accidents usually involve two par-
ticipants, most often two vehicles, is used to infer the
identity of some entities in the texts or to establish coref-
erence between two entities.
A specific naming convention in French insurance
claim reports for the vehicles involved in an accident
is that claimants must refer to their own vehicle and to
their opponent’s as A or B. This convention arises from
the pre-defined format of the claim report, on which each
of the two drivers must first answer a set of questions by
checking boxes in one of two columns A or B, thus choos-
ing for themselves one of the roles. They usually then
continue to use these labels for themselves and their op-
ponent in the free-running text, but not necessarily in
the whole text. Indeed the authors often mix first per-
son expressions with these neutral third person labels.
From R’s point of view, resolving the problem of ref-
erence, i.e. identifying the different vehicles involved in
the accident and their drivers, often requires knowledge
of F-context, particularly of the “Participants” param-
eter. We now look at several examples where knowing
that there are two vehicles involved in the scene of the
accident helps resolve anaphors.
(9) I was going down towards Bellefontaine. The
road is a narrow, windy road, lined with trees.
In a curve with not much visibility, we col-
lided. (B33)
The pronoun we in (9) refers to the two vehicles in-
volved in the accident, although the opponent’s vehicle
is not mentioned (the writer’s vehicle is implicit in I was
going down). This anaphor can only be resolved because
of the F-context “Participants” parameter. Without the
context that there should be two vehicles involved, the
pronoun we would be surprising and probably uninter-
pretable.
(10) Vehicle A waiting and stopped at the Pont de
Levallois lights. Vehicle B arrived and hit
my left side mirror with its right side mirror.
(C10)
The first proposition in (10) introduces vehicule A, i.e.
one of the two vehicules involved in the accident. The
second proposition introduces vehicule B, i.e. the other
vehicule involved in the accident. In the third proposi-
tion, the reader encountersmy left side mirror .5 If R did
not know the convention, this expression would force the
introduction of a third vehicle, which would have to be
W ’s because of the my. Indeed, without the knwoledge
that W ’s vehicle is named A or B, there is no reason to
identify vehicle A with it, even if vehicle A’s role in the
scene is then rather unclear. However, with the knowl-
edge of this convention, coreference can be resolved.
Another example is (11), where vehicle B is mentioned
in the first sentence and the second vehicle involved in
the accident is mentioned in the second sentence.
(11) Coming back home, the driver of vehicle B in
front of me lost control of his vehicle because
of sudden icing. In turn I couldn’t control
my vehicle which after 20 meters crashed into
Mrs. Louvet’s vehicle. I want to stress that
there was no ice anywhere else and we were
many vehicles skidding on this street. Nothing
could allow foreseeing such icing conditions.
(B28)
The relative clause in the second sentence refers to an ac-
cident between Mrs. Louvet’s vehicle and W ’s. Nothing,
except F-context, warrants linking vehicle B and Mrs.
Louvet’s, and at first glance, there could appear to be
three vehicles in this scene. However, because of the F-
context “Participants” parameter, and because the text
says that the accident takes place between W ’s vehicle
and vehicle B, the reader can deduce that Mrs. Louvet
is the driver of vehicle B and that there are only two
vehicles involved.
5The use of the metonymy in the expression my left
side mirror reinforces the sense of hesitation about reference
which we observe in our texts.
3.3 E-context
When setting to the task of writing such a report, W
knows the “Short” parameter, the constraint that only
about a paragraph (in a pre-defined area on the form)
may be used to relate the accident. At the same time,
W must not forget any important information whose
absence would prevent R from reconstructing the correct
factual content P , and he must thus be both exhaustive
and concise.
On the other hand, the authors know that these few
lines, meant for their insurance company, may contribute
to the final decision about their share of legal and finan-
cial liability. They know that the intended readers, the
insurance agents, must pass a judgement on their behav-
ior and will determine their share of responsibility in the
accident. Necessarily then, the authors of those reports
attempt to present their case in the best possible light
in order to minimize their responsability.
In short, W is faced with what we call “W ’s selection
problem”, namely the constraint on the choice of infor-
mation to give in order to satisfy the three goals: to be
exhaustive, to be concise, and to lessen their respons-
ability.6
These goals are not contradictory and actually become
intermingled. While describing the scene, W is trying
to argue for his innocence. Thus, the choices of which
elements are mentionned in the report can thus reveal
an argumentative strategy while helping reconstruct the
factual content of the text. The authors can choose to
adopt a “legal” framework for describing the setting of
the accident. They then try to speak the same language
as the insurance agent and give exactly the information
that the latter expects. They choose precise words to
refer accurately to the objects which are present in this
space seen from a legal point of view and which are di-
rectly relevant to traffic, e.g. road signs, markings, or
referring to events happening in this domain also from a
legal point of view, such as turn his blinker on, coming
from the left , etc.
Since it invokes legal traffic rules, this information
also evokes some particular behavior on the part of the
drivers involved. Most of the time, however, the pre-
sentation given by W is not neutral but aims to prove
either that his behavior was the one expected in the sit-
uation, or that his opponent’s behavior was wrong and
unexpected, or even both at the same time. The argu-
mentation may be explicit or left implicit. For instance,
in (12), the first two sentences set up in a very detailed
6 This problem is part of the wider language conventions
LC and constitutes a “meta-knowledge”, essential for the suc-
cess of communication: the text T must provide all the in-
formation that is necessary in order to be understood or to
convince, but only that much. This problem can be consid-
ered a particular instance of Grice’s Maxims [Grice, 1975], in
particular the Maxim of Quantity, or of Ducrot’s exhaustivity
law [Ducrot, 1972].
way a situation which is specifically controlled by traffic
rules.
(12) I was driving in my vehicle A in the right lane
reserved for vehicles going straight ahead. Ve-
hicle B was driving in the left lane reserved
for vehicles going left (ground markings with
arrows). It cut back in on my vehicle. (A12-
markings)
The presence of “ground markings with arrows” im-
plies a particular behavior on the part of vehicles driving
in that lane: they must go left. The last sentence ex-
actly contradicts this expected behavior and is intended
to prove that vehicle B made a mistake in “cutting back
in” onW ’s vehicle since it was not respecting the ground
markings. Of course, W has taken care to mention that
his own vehicle was in the correct lane.
In (13), W clearly refers to an important French traf-
fic rule, namely that the right-of-way always belongs to
the vehicle coming from the right. This right-of-way is
implied in the first sentence: vehicle B arrived from the
left at an intersection and should have let vehicule A go.
Since an accident has occurred, R may then deduce B’s
wrong behavior, which W then refers to explicitly at the
end of the text. At the same time, W takes care to insist
on his own correct behavior (at moderate speed).
(13) Vehicle B coming from my left, I find myself
at the intersection, at moderate speed, about
40 km/h, when vehicle B hits my vehicle,
and denies me the right-of-way from the right.
(A4)
In (14), the first sentence indicates that the driver of
vehicle B did something illegal, since passing a vehicle
must, according to French traffic rules, be done on the
left. The end of the text then reinforces B’s wrong be-
havior through the use of lexical elements such as slalom
and ran away.
(14) The driver of vehicle B passing me on
the right caught my right front bumper and
dragged me towards the movable wall on
the Genenevilliers Bridge, which I violently
smashed into. According to the witness who
was following me, the driver of vehicle B was
doing a slalom between the cars. After hitting
me, he ran away and couldn’t be caught up
with by the above-mentioned witness. (A11)
The authors often express their own psychological
states (e.g. eˆtre surpris “to be surprised” in (15)) or
thoughts during the accident (je ne m’attendais pas “I
didn’t expect” in (16)), although these are not a priori
directly interesting for the insurance company.
(15) I was surprised by the person who braked in
front of me, not being able to change lanes,
and the road being wet (A15)
(16) I didn’t expect that a driver would wish to pass
me for there weren’t two lanes marked on the
portion of the road where I was stopped. (A5)
Mentioning them allows W to explain his behavior,
particularily in establishing a contrast between what was
expected and what happened in reality. W can claim
not to have had any control over what was actually hap-
pening because that was a consequence of unforeseeable
and/or uncontrollable circumstances: the road was wet
in (17 b.), the pavement was slippery in (17 a.). Thus W
cannot be considered as responsible for the accident.
(17) a. on impact, and because of the slippery
pavement, my vehicle skids, and hits the
metal railing around a tree, whence a sec-
ond front impact. (A4)
b. and the road being wet, I wasn’t able to
stop completely in time. (A15)
The very frequent use of negation is also a favorite clue
to indicate implicitly an opposition between what should
have happened and what actually occurred, for instance
in in (17 b.) and in (18). The use of negation can also
be a way of not mentioning explicitly the collision (see
section 3.2).
(18) I wasn’t able to avoid the car which was com-
ing with great speed. (A8)
Another argumentative device is the reverse of the
metonymy conflating the vehicle and its driver which
we saw in 3.1. For instance, in (17 a.), it is not W , but
the car which is the subject of the two verbs, as if it was
responsible for the events. Because they suppress the
agent, reflexive verbs (la porte s’est ouverte “the door
opened”) or the passive voice (j’ai e´te´ de´porte´ “I was
thrown off course”) instead of a plain active, are two
contructions which also help suggest that W was not
involved in the course of events and cannot be held re-
sponsible for what happened.
To summarize, the examination of the terms used and
of the elements which the authors choose to mention in
their texts reveals that there are two strategies they can
follow to argue their case in the most persuasive way:
• A. Trying to push the blame onto the opponent by
accusing him of abnormal behavior
• B. Contrasting what was expected and what hap-
pened in reality, by invoking unforeseable circumstances.
With either strategy, W must first show that he has
done everything that was required in the given circum-
stances and will always try to appear as blameless as
possible. Of course the two strategies are not mutually
exclusive as shown by (8) above. (19) is also an exam-
ple of a mixture of both strategies, in which where W
piles up all sorts of attenuating circumstances and also
emphasizes (immediately put the brakes on) his own ap-
propriate reactions.
(19) I was driving at about
45 km/h in a small one-way street where cars
were parked on both sides. Popping suddenly
on my right coming out of a private build-
ing garage, Mrs. Glorieux’s vehicle was at a
very short distance from my vehicle; passage
being impossible: surprised, I immediately put
the brakes on but the impact was unavoidable.
(A14)
4 Inferences
In this section, we give evidence for the role which the
knowledge of the argumentative function of such texts
plays in the process of interpretation, particularly in the
reconstruction of its factual content.
4.1 Lexical Ambiguity
As shown in (20), the original French text of the exam-
ple given in (3) presents a an exemple of this kind of
ambiguity, since in French, the word droite is ambiguous
between the two interpretations right and straight .7
(20) Je roulais sur la partie droite de la chausse´e
(A8)
I was driving on the
right-hand side / straight portion of the road
Here, even though the whole text can also be inter-
preted with the straight meaning, the right interpreta-
tion is more plausible. However, only an argumentative
type of reasoning can lead R to prefer the latter. Since
it is well-known to both R and W that in France one
drives on the right, by specifying that he was driving
on the right side of the road, W violates the Maxim
of Quantity (i.e. not to say anything superfluous) and
therefore must be taken as intending to convey some
other information. In this case, it must be to assert that
his behavior was conforming to the Code de la route (the
“Rules of the Road”), which is indeed a pertinent fact to
mention. Here, informational redundancy by itself car-
ries some information which allows inference. We can
thus formulate the rule that: “In case of ambiguity, R
should prefer the interpretation from which correct be-
havior on W ’s part can be inferred”.
4.1.1 Time Reference Ambiguity
In the first sentence of (5 b.), given in (21), the use of
the pluperfect had switched on is ambiguous.
(21) Being momentarily stopped
in the right lane on Boulevard des Italiens,
I had switched my blinker on; I was at a stop
and getting ready to change lanes. (A7)
7 If the adjective droite means straight, its opposite is
then courbe/curved , if it means right , the opposite is then
gauche/left .
The pluperfect implies that the process being talked
about is perceived with another past event as a point
of reference, which may not yet have been mentioned.8
Here, two different referential situations can be envis-
aged, with two different consequences:
• If the accident itself is chosen as the point of refer-
ence, switching the blinker on signals a future change of
lanes. It must therefore be the left blinker. This con-
clusion requires geometrical reasoning: “If X is stopped
in the right lane and if X wants to change lanes, X can
only go left”.
• If the time of stopping is chosen as the point of
reference, switching the blinker on is prior to the time of
stopping and thus signals it. It must then be the right
blinker, since the vehicle is in the right lane.
Arguments of the “Maxims” type must then be used.
R cannot assume that too much information is present in
the text. For the blinker to be switched on before stop-
ping would not be relevant since the accident occurred
after that of stopping, when W started again. On the
other hand, the fact that W did switch his blinker on
before starting again is very relevant from an argumen-
tative point of view, since it means “W behaved in the
right way and did what was required”. Therefore, by
the rule proposed above, the first interpretation is cho-
sen and R may conclude that W had his left blinker
on.
4.1.2 Action or Intention?
Sometimes, the problem for R is to determine whether
an action presented as an intended future event has re-
mained at a purely intentional level or whether actions
have already been taken to reach it. For instance, when
the intended action belongs to a script with sequential
steps, the question arises whether some of the prepara-
tory actions belonging to the script have already been
accomplished.
We have seen that there are two possible choices for
a point of reference in the interpretation of the pluper-
fect in (21). In addition, the verb s’appreˆter a` can have
several interpretations. Like to get ready (which we give
here as its translation), it can mean to be about to and
then it is a simple aspectual auxiliary focussing on the
beginning of the action (inchoative). It can also have a
more agentive interpretation and then it means to ac-
tively prepare for .
In the inchoative to be about to interpretation, the
action of “switching the blinker on” is an event indepen-
dent of “changing lanes”; in the agentive to prepare for
interpretation, that same action corresponds to one of
the preparatory acts. But more crucially, in the agen-
tive interpretation, W may already have started chang-
ing lanes and then probably would be at fault, while in
the inchoative reading, W would still be stopped and
would be innocent.
8 The situation is exactly parallel in French and English.
It seems that in most of the cases we find in our texts,
such an intended future event is more than simply in-
tentional and that W has indeed already started to act.
Otherwise it would not be possible to explain the acci-
dent in (21) ((5 b.)), since there would be no reason for
W ’s car to have been damaged if W had not already
started turning left.
Similarly in the case of the texts given in (22) and
(23) below, the only plausible reconstruction of the ac-
cident requires vehicle A to have already started the ac-
tion which is presented as an intention (Wanting to pass
a hauler in (22) and I wanted to enter the second lane
in (23)).
(22) Wanting to pass a hauler with its
right blinker on, the latter turned left, forcing
me to steer left to avoid it. The car skidded
on the wet pavement and struck a sidewalk
then a fence straight ahead. The truck driver
had indeed switched on his left blinker, but the
trailer was inverting the signal to the right.
Not having touched me, the driver declared
himself unconcerned by the situation and re-
fused to draw a report. Having left my car to
call a mechanic, I came back to find it with
the right back door bashed in with no note left
by the guilty party. (A2)
(23) I was stopped at the intersection wishing to
take the road on which the intense traffic is
going one-way in two lanes; as the last vehi-
cle of the flow was coming, I wanted to enter
the second lane, leaving the first one free for
it. The moment I started, I heard the shock
in the back; I wasn’t expecting a driver would
wish to pass me for there weren’t two lanes
marked on the portion of the road where I was
stopped. (A5)
Instead of using an imperfective verbal form (i.e. e´tant
en train de de´passer un semi-remorque (“while passing a
hauler”) in (22), or j’e´tais en train de tourner a` gauche
(“I was turning left”) in (23)) which would clearly in-
dicate that the action had already started, W chooses
the intentional form and in doing so, creates an ambi-
guity for R: “Had W actually already done something
or not?”. This lack of precision (or downright lie?) is
intentional and allowsW to try to lessen his responsibil-
ity. This will succeed if R opts for a purely intentional
reading of the verbal form.
4.1.3 Argumentation-Based Inference
We said earlier that in (1) R could infer that, though
this is not stated in the text, W probably wanted to turn
right, but that discourse argumentation was required for
this conclusion. Indeed, the script for going through
stop-sign says that “If X wants to turn right at a stop-
sign, X should check to the left; if X wants to turn left,
X should check to the left and to the right.”.
Since W does not mention checking to the right but
only checking to the left, it means that W did not in-
tend to turn left. IfW was going to turn left, to mention
checking to the right would be pertinent information for
the insurance company since it would show that W had
done everything required in such circumstances. In fact,
it is the non-homogeneity of this discourse which sug-
gests that W did turn left: either no check should be
mentioned or if only one is mentioned, then R may infer
that the other one was not required. In another line of
argument, checking to the left is also mentioned by W
in order to explain that, since he was looking to the left
(and not straight ahead), he could not have seen that
the other car had not turned right.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we address the general issue of “how to de-
fine context” and we have chosen an experimental rather
than a theoretical approach to this question. By select-
ing real occurring texts, instead of texts written to illus-
trate particular phenomena, and an homogeneous corpus
of texts written in similar circumstances, we were able
to focus on the characteristic properties of this text type
and thus to better define the notion of context.
We have tried to show the importance of situational,
cultural and textual presuppositions from the point of
view of both the writer and the reader. As this work
constitutes a first step in the study of natural language
semantics in the context of an NLP project, the approach
adopted here is an attempt to automate the process of
understanding these texts and deriving inferences from
them. Some of the crucial issues in NLP are precisely
how to define and describe the different types of knowl-
edge involved in the processes of writing and reading
texts, and how to establish rules which mimic the rea-
soning involved in these activities.
Here, we take advantage of the specificity of the texts–
the authors narrate events leading to a car accident while
trying to lessen their responsability– to circumscribe the
type of knowledge required and to give some rules of
interpretation, valid for this type of text, in this type of
context.
We have determined three types of context: K-
context, the non-linguistic knowledge required for this
domain, F-context, the more specific context of the
events being narrated, and E-context, the discourse con-
text for this text type. The interest of the corpus we
have chosen lies in the fact that it contains texts which
involve the same three types of contexts: K-context be-
cause they all deal with road traffic, F-context because
they all deal with car accidents and E-context because
they are all insurance claim reports.
We have shown the importance of E-context, in partic-
ular the crucial role played by the argumentation which
the writer is known to be pursuing and which allows the
reader to make a number of inferences. These inferences
then help him clarify the text and choose between com-
peting interpretations.
It would be interesting to analyze the two correspond-
ing texts, by two opponents reporting the same accident,
in order to establish which part of the information is ob-
jectively factual and shared by both texts, and which
part of the information is argumentatively biased, thus
better distinguishing the subjective part of the two dis-
courses. The omission of information, which we men-
tioned as one of the argumentative devices on the part
ofW and as a basis for inference on the part of R, would
then become an even more important factor in the anal-
ysis. Very few such pairs of texts are available, but in
the continuation of this project, we may try to do some
further work based on those we have.
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